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The basis of that decision was that since the stronger roads have no constitutional
right to receive more than a fair return, and since they would receive more than a fair
return under uniform rates set to provide the weaker roads with a fair return, it was
competent for Congress to declare that half of the income above a fair return should be
held in trust, and to appropriate it to serve the public interest. In the principal case
the Court reasoned that the privilege of a consolidation lease was like the privilege of
receiving more than a fair return, and that the order conditioning award of theprivilege
upon payment of dismissal compensation did not infringe substantive due process.

Corporations-Laches and Acquiescence as a Bar to Relief of Minority Stockholder
from Destruction of His Rights to Arrearages on Preferred Stock-[Delaware].A Delaware corporation, pursuant to the requisite vote of its stockholders, purported
to amend its charter to provide for the conversion of each share of its preferred stock,
on which there were accrued arrearages of $21.25 per share, into five shares of common
stock. The exchange was to be effected without discharge of the unpaid dividends on
the preferred. A dissenting stockholder sought and obtained a judgment that the
amendment did not foreclose his rights to accrued dividends., After learning of a compromise and preparation for dismissal of this suit, the plaintiff, who had caused his
stock to be voted against the amendment, attempted to intervene and to be substituted as party plaintiff. When his motion to intervene was denied without prejudice,2 the plaintiff brought a separate action. The corporation defended on the ground
that the plaintiff was barred by laches and acquiescence in that he had delayed institution of the action, and had accepted dividends after consummation of the purported
amendment of the charter. The dividends were on the common shares which the plaintiff had refused to accept in exchange for his preferred stock. The court sustained the
defendant's plea, and dismissed the suit. Frank v. Wilson & Co.3
Although many rights of dissenting stockholders have been held subject to destruction by charter amendment,4 the courts have frowned upon the elimination of accrued
cumulative dividend arrearages.5 When attempted elimination of arrearages is held to
I Keller v. Wilson & Co., 19 o At. zx5 (Del. 1936).
2 Keller v. Wilson & Co., 194 Ad. 45 (Del. Ch. 1937). The court pointed out that the
plaintiff's bill was drawn to permit intervention by all parties in the same position as the
plaintiff, but that the intervenor was not in the plaintiff's position.
3 9 A. (2d) 82 (Del. Ch. 1939).
4 7 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. §§ 3695-3698 (perm. ed. 1931).
s Kellerv. VWilson& Co., I9oAtl. ii5 (Del. 1936);Johnsonv. Consolidated Film Industries,
197 At. 489 (Del. 1937). That the Wilson & Co. charter amendment and others like it were
invalid as to dissenting stockholders was established in Keller v. Wilson & Co., 9o At. x[5
(Del. 1936), and similar plans were abandoned by other corporations contemplating the
elimination of arrearages on preferred stock. 28 Time, No. 21 at 85 (November 23, 1936).
For a general discussion of plans for scaling down arrearages on cumulative preferred stock
see SEC, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel, and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, pt. VII, § I1 (1938); and notes in 4
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 645 (1937), 46 Yale L. J. 620 (1937) , and 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 1o4 (1938).
A treatment of the development of Delaware law and statutes as related to the Keller case
may be found in 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 139 (1936) and 35 Mich. L. Rev. 620 (I937). A discussion of the rights of assenting stockholders in the Keller v. Wilson & Co. situation may be
found in 31 Ill. L. Rev. 1092 (i937).
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be unauthorized by the statute, several forms of relief are available to a dissenting
stockholder. The most drastic in its effect, the setting aside of the attempted charter
amendment, 6 will not normally be granted, since the objecting stockholder not only is
in no way injured by the conduct of those preferred stockholders who relinquish their
rights, but probably is benefited by his advance in priority. Relief might better be
given to the plaintiff in the form of an injunction forbidding the corporation to pay
dividends on any stock junior to that owned by the plaintiff until after the payment of
all the arrearages on the plaintiff's stock.7 Certainly such relief is no more than the
plaintiff contracted for when he purchased his preferred stock.
A third possibility for relief, in a case such as the principal one, might take the form
of a judgment for a cash dividend.' This relief might be based on the theory that a
corporation may not declare a dividend upon common stock until it has paid all the
arrearages on its cumulative preferred, and that declaration of dividends on the common confers upon preferred stockholders an immediate right to arrearages. A judgment for a cash dividend might also be secured upon the ground that dividends may
not be declared in favor of those preferred stockholders who had exchanged their stock
for common unless a dividend is also declared in favor of other preferred stockholders.
Judgment for a cash dividend would not seem to be a necessary remedy, however,
since the dissenter otherwise would retain his right to full payment of arrearages before
dividend payments on common stock were permissible.
Even though readjustment is authorized by statute a further remedy for abridgment of rights is afforded dissenters in many states by statute. A dissenter is entitled
to an appraisal of his stock and purchase by the corporation at the appraised value.9
A preferred stockholder who dissents to an attempted destruction of his arrearages
does not have an unqualified right to relief. His claim may be barred by acquiescence,
by laches, or by the statute of limitations. Acquiescence may take the form of quiesence under such circumstances that assent may reasonably be inferred,2o or of affirmative action inconsistent with disapproval." Affirmative acts of dissenters that have
been held indicative of acquiescence include exchange of shares on the basis provided
by the amendment,- or, as in the present case, receipt and retention of dividends
paid on the stock to which the stockholder is entitled under the terms of the amendment, but which he did not accept.' 3 Voting in favor of the amendment would seem
to be either the strongest form of acquiescence, or something even more than acquiescence-a participation.
Acquiescence will bar the stockholder's cause of action without proof of actual detrimental reliance thereon. The rule finds basis in the necessity of securing finality in
6 13

Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 5823 (perm. ed. 1932).
v. Federal United Co., 6 A. (2d) 618 (Del. Ch. 1939); Patterson v. Durham
Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 8o6, 200 S.E. 9o6 ('939).
s Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280 N.W. 688 (1938).
9 13 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 589i (perm. ed. 1932); SEC, op. cit. supra note 5, app. B,
pt. IV.
10 Bay Newfoundland Co. v. Wilson & Co., 4 A. (2d) 668, 671 (Del. Ch. 1939); cf. Lowndes
v. Wicks, 69 Conn. iS, 36 AUt. 1072 (1897).
113 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 5823 (pern. ed. 1932).
v. Remington Rand Co., i94 At. 95 (Del. Ch. 1937).
1
"Trounstine
3 Frank v. Wilson & Co., 9 A. (2d) 82 (Del. Ch. 1939).
7Havender
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matters affecting the intricate relationships of the corporation with its stockholders'4
and in the desire to protect third persons, for example those purchasing stock frGm
the corporation after the reduction of arrearages.
In addition to acquiescence, courts utilize the doctrine of laches in order to achieve
the desired result. Courts sometimes employ the terms laches and acquiescence concurrently without specifying which defense is relied upon as a basis for the decision.'s
A possible explanation of this is that inaction may be an evidence of acquiescence. 6
The two terms, however, are not coextensive. 17
Acquiescence implies active assent,' 8 while laches, it is said, imports passive assent,9
characterized by a delay working detriment to another because of his change of position in reliance upon the presumption that silence indicates acceptance of the validity
of an action which might be challenged."0 The process involved in a finding of laches
constitutes a balancing of the prejudice to another caused by the complainant's delay,
against the reasons given by the complainant in explanation.2t An instance of the
prejudice to the corporation may be the considerable trouble and expense attendant
upon effecting the exchange and reclassification of shares, some or all of which might
possibly have been prevented if the dissenter had brought suit seasonably. Furthermore, since the issue of the new stock may be followed by active trading in the shares"
detriment to third parties whose rights had intervened because of the complainant's
delay may result should the complainant be granted relief.3
So in the presence of laches courts find ready and understandable support for a
denial of relief to dilatory stockholders in the harm to other parties which would result
from the stockholder's delay, were his suit successful. But since the defense of laches
is equitable,24 if the delay in attacking the act was induced not by mere inaction, but
by ignorance, caused possibly by non-disclosure or fraud of the directors,'s the defense
of laches will not bar the stockholder's suit, 6 although passage of time, with conse'4 Romer v. Porcelain Products Co., 2 A. (2d) 75 (Del. Ch. 1938).
ISThe Chancellor in the Frank case did not specify whether his decision was based on laches
or acquiescence, but he indicated that there was a difference between the two defenses.
6
x Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, io Pac. 674 (x886).
'7 Bay Newfoundland Co. v. Wilson & Co., 4 A. (2d) 668 (Del. Ch. '939).
s Rodick v. Pineo, 120 Me. i6o, 113 Ad. 45 (1921).
9Wood, Limitation of Actions § 62 (4th ed. 1916). This review was approved in Kenyon
v. National Life Ass'n, 39 App. Div. 276, 57 N.Y. Supp. 6o (1899).
"Paducah v. Gillispie, 273 Ky. ioi, ii 5 S.W. (2d) 574 (1938); Marion v. Altman, 120
N.J. Law I6, 197 At. 724 (1938); see Shea v. Shea, 4 N.E. (2d) IOI5, ioi8 (Mass. 1936); Curl
v. Vance, i16 W.Va. 419, i8 S.E. 412 (I935); Lindberg v. Linder, 113 Cal. App. 213, 23 P.
(2d) 842 (I933); Rodick v. Pineo, 120 Me. i6o, 164, 113 Ad. 45, 47 (I92I).
21 Osincup v. Henthorn, 89 Kan. 58, 13o Pac. 652 (1913).
- Romer v. Porcelain Products Co., 2 A. (2d) 75 (Del. Ch. I938).
' Beling v. American Tobacco Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 32, 65 Ad. 725 (19o7); Dana v. American
Tobacco Co., 72 NJ. Eq. 44, 65 At. 730 (x9o7), aff'd 73 N.J. Eq. 736, 69 At. 223 (198o); Kent
v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N.Y. 159 (1879). But cf. Knoxville v. Knoxville &0. R. Co., 22
Fed. 758 (C.C. Tenn. 1884).
24 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § i44o (4 th ed. i919).
's2 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 756 (perm. ed. 1931).
26 Standard Oil Co. of Colorado v. Standard Oil Co., 72 F. (2d) 524 (C.C.A. ioth 1934);
Douglass v. Concord & M.R. Co., 72 N.H. 26, 54 At. 883 (1903).
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quent acts in reliance, may necessitate modification of the remedy granted. 7 Since
knowledge of rights is an essential element of laches, 5 the delay alleged to be laches
will be measured only from the time when the stockholder became or could reasonably
have become aware of the true state of affairs.29
Apart from other factors the court may employ the statute of limitations to defeat
the claims of a stockholder, although usually in a case such as the principal one 3* a claim
so barred would also be barred by laches, which is independent of the statute. 3' The
statute of limitations is often applied in equity by statutory enactment or by analogy. 3 2 Where it is not applied, courts often use the statute to determine what constitutes a reasonable time with respect to application of the laches doctrine, 3 but if a
strict view is maintained, it would seem that this analogy is not well taken, for the only
consideration of importance in deciding whether the defense of laches is to prevail is
the damage caused to the defendant or third parties by the plaintiff's delay.

Injunctions-Restitution and Damages as Remedies for Wrongful Issuance of
Injunction-[Federal].-After final dismissal' of a suit maintained by a power company to enjoin the making of a PWA loan to a county for the purpose of building a competing power plant, the county brought suit against the power company for restitution of the profits gained by the company at the expense of the county by reason of the
delay in putting the proposed plant into operation.2 On appeal from the decree of the
district court dismissing the suit, held, the relief could not be granted as damages aris27Int'l & G.N.R. Co. v. Bremond, 53 Tex. 96 (i88o) (plaintiff permitted personal recovery,
although right to enjoin corporate action was lost by laches).

28Kessler & Co. v. Ensley Co., 129 Fed. 397, 418 (C.C. Ala. 19o4); Briggs v. Buzzell, 164
Minn. x16, 204 N.W. 548 (1925); Wright v. Simpson, 200 Ill. 56, 65 N.E. 628 (1902). X3
Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 5876 (perm. ed., 1932).
29Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Ore. 70, 96 Pac. 528 (igo8); Kessler & Co. v. Ensley &
Co., 129 Fed. 397 (C.C. Ala. 19o4); Taylor v. S. N. Alabama R. Co., 13 Fed. 152 (C.C. Ala.
1882). 13 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 5876 (perm. ed. 1932). Cases other than those concerned with
lack of knowledge concerning corporate transactions which state the same rule are Waters v.
Waters, 155 Md. 146, r42 AUt. 297 (1928); Briggs v. Buzzell, 164 Minn. 16, 204 N.W. 548
(1925).

30Frank v. Wilson & Co., 9 A. (2d) 82 (Del. Ch. z939).
3' Smalley v. Queen City Bank, 94 S.W. (2d) 954 (Mo. App. 1936); see Peabody v. Carr,
313 Pa. 325, 169 At. 126 (1933).
3' 1 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 419.

33Gillons v. Shell Co. of California, 86 F. (2d) 6oo (C.C.A. 9th 1936); White v. Harby,
176 S.C. 36, 179 S.E. 671 (1935).

I For an account of the litigation in this suit, see Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co.,
107 F. (2d) 484 (C.C.A. 4 th 1939).
2 After the first decree had been vacated in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme

Court in 299 U.S. 259 (1936), the power company obtained a preliminary injunction upon posting of the bond required for preliminary injunction under the statute, 38 Stat. 738 (1914),
28 U.S.C.A. § 382 (1928). The county also sought damages on this bond in the instant case,
but was refused on the ground that the court has discretion as to the prosecution of the bond,
Russell v. Farley, io5 U.S. 433 (i88i); cf. Houghton v. Meyer, 2o8 U.S. 149 (1907). At the
date of the decision in Russell v. Farley there was no federal bond statute; and it may well be

